Winning the ball back in five seconds is decided by how you lost it, which makes the counterpress an attacking design problem.
You counterpress with your last pass, not your first sprint
Two teams lose possession thirty metres from the opposition goal. One has six players within fifteen metres of the ball and wins it back before the defender has lifted his head. The other has two, and it concedes. The difference is not desire, work rate or a stopwatch. It is the pass that preceded the loss.
If your attack ends with a low ball into a crowded pocket, the crowd is yours as much as theirs, and the turnover happens in a place you have already surrounded. If it ends with a switch to an isolated winger, the loss happens forty metres from your nearest support and there is no counterpress available at any sprint speed. Same team, same fitness, same instructions, completely different outcome, decided several seconds earlier.
This reframes what the training ground should be doing. Sides famous for pressing after losing the ball are usually not training the pressing much. They are training combination play in tight zones, which produces losses in tight zones, which produces the recoveries everyone praises. The recovery is a downstream effect of the shape of the attack.
Once you see it that way, some coaching orthodoxy looks wrong. Telling players to counterpress harder is close to useless if the team's final action is a cross from a standing start, because there is nobody within range of the header. Telling them to stop crossing from standing starts is a counterpressing instruction, even though it never mentions defending.
I will accept the obvious pushback. Isolating a winger one against one is a good idea for other reasons and no team should give it up because the rest defence gets awkward. The answer is not to ban it but to be honest about what it costs, and to accept that when you play that pass, the next twenty seconds are a defensive event and should be staffed like one.
What I would like to see counted is the distance from the ball to your third nearest player at the moment possession is lost. One number, taken across a season, would separate teams that recover well from teams that attack in a way that makes recovery possible. My guess is those are nearly the same list, and that the causation runs backwards from how it is usually told.

